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Abstract	and	Keywords
This	chapter	situates	Schmitt	as	a	jurist	and	specifically	as	a	scholar	occupying	a	distinctive	position	within	German
state	theory.	Schmitt’s	overall	objective	was	to	build	a	theory	of	the	constitution	of	political	authority	from	the	most
basic	elements	of	the	subject,	and	in	this	respect	he	sought	to	make	a	contribution	to	the	discipline	of	politonomy.
A	concept	first	alluded	to	by	Schmitt	but	one	he	never	developed,	politonomy	concerns	the	inquiry	into	the	most
basic	laws	and	practices	of	the	political.	The	chapter	examines	Schmitt’s	ambivalent	position	in	politonomy,	which
was	rooted	in	his	distrust	of	the	scientific	significance	of	general	concepts.	To	the	extent	that	Schmitt
acknowledged	the	existence	of	a	law	of	the	political,	this	chapter	argues	that	it	is	found	implicitly	within	his
embrace	of	institutionalism	in	the	1930s	and	later	in	his	account	of	nomos	as	the	basic	law	of	appropriation,
division,	and	production.
Keywords:	Schmitt, 	politonomy,	Staatslehre,	institutionalism,	concrete	order	thinking,	nomos
Introduction
In	his	paper	“Nomos-Nahme-Name,”	appended	as	the	second	of	three	concluding	corollaries	to	the	English
translation	of	The	Nomos	of	the	Earth,	Carl	Schmitt	comments	that	it	seemed	peculiar	that	when	a	new	scholarly
discipline	emerged	at	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	century	it	came	to	be	known	as	national	economy	or	political
economy.	How	strange,	he	suggests,	that	with	the	extension	of	the	concept	of	nomos	from	the	household	to	the
polity	the	term	retained	its	linguistic	relation	to	the	household.	Rather	than	being	called	polito-nomy,	it	was	labeled
eco-nomy	(1957,	339).	As	Schmitt	would	have	been	aware,	there	were	particular	reasons	for	this	nomenclature:
this	eighteenth-century	extension	was	primarily	a	consequence	of	the	process	by	which	Cameralist	methods	of
managing	the	prince’s	household	resources	were	extended	to	the	task	of	establishing	and	maintaining	the	well-
ordered	commonwealth	(Raeff	1983;	Bourdieu	2004;	Tribe	2006;	Loughlin	2010,	ch.	14).	Schmitt	was	nevertheless
making	an	astute	observation,	and	one	that	in	the	light	of	more	recent	studies	has	assumed	a	heightened
significance.
Work	by	such	scholars	as	Foucault	(1978,	2007),	Mann	(1993),	Gorski	(2003),	and	Agamben	(2011)	has	identified
this	extension	as	being	of	pivotal	significance	for	understanding	the	character	of	modern	government.	The
transition	that	took	place	in	the	eighteenth	century,	Foucault	argues,	was	“from	an	art	of	government	to	a	political
science,”	otherwise	understood	as	a	change	“from	a	regime	dominated	by	structures	of	sovereignty	to	one	ruled
by	techniques	of	government”	(1978,	217–18).	But	he	goes	on	to	suggest	that,	far	from	it	dissipating	as	a
consequence	of	the	emergence	of	political	economy,	the	question	of	sovereignty	is	presented	with	an	ever-greater
force.	That	question	involves	“an	attempt	to	see	what	juridical	and	institutional	form,	what	foundation	in	the	law,
could	be	given	to	the	sovereignty	that	characterizes	a	state”	(218).	This	is	the	central	question	with	which	Schmitt
was	concerned.	It	is	a	specifically	juristic	question.	It	is	also	the	central	question	of	a	more	precisely	specified
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exercise	of	politonomy.
Politonomy,	it	is	suggested,	should	not	be	taken	to	refer	merely	to	the	techniques	of	governmental	management	of
the	state’s	resources.	In	this	more	precise	formulation,	it	is	a	broader	science,	one	that	seeks	to	specify	the	law	by
which	the	political	manifests	itself	as	a	domain	of	reality.	Schmitt	is	best	known	today	as	the	quintessential	theorist
of	the	autonomy	of	the	political	(Bolsinger	2001;	Schmitt	2007).	Yet	he	also	maintained	that	his	entire	scholarly
contribution	remained	that	of	a	jurist	concerned	to	examine	the	constitution	of	modern	political	authority.	In	this
respect,	Schmitt	can	be	placed	within	a	line	of	political	jurists	who	conceived	public	law	broadly,	as	“an
assemblage	of	rules,	principles,	canons,	maxims,	customs,	usages,	and	manners	that	condition	and	sustain	the
activity	of	governing”	(Loughlin	2003,	30). 	I	have	previously	referred	to	these	jurists—a	lineage	including	Bodin,
Althusius,	Lipsius,	Grotius,	Hobbes,	Spinoza,	Locke,	and	Pufendorf	in	the	sixteenth	and	seventeenth	centuries	and
extending	to	Montesquieu,	Rousseau,	Kant,	Fichte,	Smith,	and	Hegel	in	the	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries—as
engaging	in	an	elaboration	of	public	law	as	political	jurisprudence	(Loughlin	2010,	ch.	6).	This	body	of	work	seeks
to	elaborate	the	constitution	of	political	authority.
Schmitt	firmly	situates	himself	within	this	lineage;	he	even	claims	to	be	its	“last	conscious	representative”	and	“its
last	teacher	and	researcher	in	an	existential	sense”	(1950,	75).	This	is	significant,	not	least	because	at	the	core	of
these	inquiries	is	the	attempt	to	specify	the	law	of	the	political.	In	this	sense,	these	jurists	can	be	understood	to	be
engaged	in	politonomy.	Schmitt	recognizes	that	a	“word	bound	to	nomos	is	measured	by	nomos	and	subject	to	it,”
as	is	illustrated	by	the	words	astronomy	and	gastronomy	(1957,	338).	Following	this	logic,	it	seems	evident	that	his
various	studies—which	extend	from	an	explanation	of	the	autonomy	of	the	political	(2007)	through	to	an	analysis	of
the	foundational	concepts	of	sovereignty	([1922]	2005),	legality	([1932]	2004),	and	constitutional	order	([1928]
2008)	and	to	his	account	of	the	order	of	ordering	([1950]	2006)—constitute	a	major	contribution	to	the	discipline	of
politonomy.
The	objective	of	this	chapter	is	to	examine	and	evaluate	Schmitt’s	scholarship	as	a	contribution	to	politonomy.	I
begin	by	situating	Schmitt	as	a	jurist	and	especially	as	a	Staatsrechtler,	that	is,	as	one	who	occupied	a	position
within	the	distinctively	German	juristic	tradition	of	state	theory.	Having	situated	him	within	that	tradition,	I	consider
whether	Schmitt	acknowledged	a	basic	law	of	the	political.	I	conclude	that	his	position	on	this	issue	is	ambivalent
and	that	this	ambivalence	flows	from	his	distrust	of	the	scientific	significance	of	general	concepts.	To	the	extent
that	he	acknowledged	any	such	law,	I	suggest	that	it	is	to	be	found	implicitly	within	his	embrace	of	institutionalism	in
the	1930s	and	later	in	his	account	of	nomos	as	the	basic	law	of	appropriation,	division,	and	production.	Having
focused	on	his	jurisprudential	arguments,	I	seek	finally	to	situate	Schmitt’s	work	within	the	modern	practice	of
political	jurisprudence	and	to	assess	his	general	contribution	to	politonomy.
Schmitt	the	Jurist
On	several	occasions	Schmitt	comments	that	everything	he	published	had	been	written	as	a	scholarly	contribution
to	jurisprudence	and	in	particular	as	contributions	to	two	fields	of	legal	scholarship:	constitutional	law	and
international	law.	These	disciplines,	he	explains,	were	the	fields	that	were	most	directly	exposed	to	“danger	from
‘the	political’”	(1950,	55).	He	goes	on	to	argue	that	although	no	jurist	working	in	these	disciplines	can	escape	this
danger,	the	dominant	legal	philosophies	of	positivism	and	normativism	that	had	emerged	in	the	late	nineteenth
century	seemed	to	have	been	devised	as	attempts	to	avoid	this	problem.	Positivist	public	lawyers	sought	to
exclude	politics	by	the	simple	trick	of	presupposing	the	authority	of	the	constitution	as	the	fundamental	law	of	the
subject.	And	as	its	name	suggests,	normativism	stands	for	the	belief	that	law	can	be	grasped	as	an	autonomous
discipline	constructed	according	to,	and	bounded	by,	its	own	norms	or	laws. 	Schmitt’s	essential	point	is	that	the
prevailing	tendency	of	lawyers	to	redefine	the	boundaries	of	their	fields	to	exclude	its	political	dimensions	offered
no	scholarly	solution.	It	could	lead	only	to	a	skewed	understanding	of	the	nature	of	their	discipline.
Rejecting	the	normativist	claim	about	law’s	autonomous	character,	Schmitt	contends	that	the	modern	concept	of
law	is	in	fact	derivative	of	the	political.	Positive	law	is,	in	other	words,	the	product	of	political	power.	The	modern
jurist	cannot	avoid	this	fact;	the	most	a	jurist	can	do	“is	mitigate	the	danger	[of	exposure	to	the	political]	either	by
settling	into	remote	neighbouring	areas,	disguising	himself	as	a	historian	or	a	philosopher,	or	by	carrying	to
extreme	perfection	the	art	of	caution	and	camouflage”	(1950,	55).	Schmitt	refused	to	retreat,	pouring	scorn	on
jurists	who	deployed	techniques	of	caution	and	camouflage.	His	work	sought	directly	to	engage	with	the
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relationship	between	the	legal	and	the	political:	it	constituted	an	exploration	of	the	nature	of	public	law	elaborated
from	a	perspective	that	asserts	the	primacy	of	the	political.
Schmitt	is	sometimes	regarded	as	an	occasional	writer	(Löwith	1995),	seen	at	his	most	incisive	and	stimulating
when	adopting	a	polemical	argument	in	essay	form.	When	his	work	is	assessed	as	a	contribution	to	political
jurisprudence,	however,	he	is	revealed	to	be	a	more	systematic	thinker.	Possessing	an	extensive	knowledge	of	the
historical	and	comparative	study	of	the	discipline,	Schmitt’s	writing	addresses	the	foundational	questions	in	public
law	in	a	rigorous	manner,	and	it	displays	an	acute	appreciation	of	the	discipline’s	main	points	of	tension.	Viewed	in
its	entirety,	Schmitt’s	writing	seeks	systematically	to	elaborate	on	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	the	legal
and	the	political	and	on	that	basis	to	build	a	concept	of	public	law.
If	correct,	this	assessment	explains	some	of	the	confusion	and	controversy	surrounding	his	work.	In	later	life
Schmitt	writes,	“I	have	always	spoken	and	written	as	a	lawyer	and,	accordingly,	only	to	lawyers	and	for	lawyers.”
(1991,	17).	It	was	his	particular	misfortune,	he	contends,	“that	the	lawyers	of	my	time	had	become	technical
managers	of	positive	law,	profoundly	uninformed	and	uneducated,	at	best	Goetheans	and	neutralized
humanitarians”	(17). 	Consequently,	he	elaborates,	those	political	and	social	theorists	who	had	followed	the	lead	of
the	lawyers’	criticisms	“would	stumble	with	every	word	and	every	formulation	and	tear	me	apart	like	a	desert	fox”
(17).	There	is	a	considerable	degree	of	self-serving	pathos	in	those	words.	Yet	his	core	point	remains.	Schmitt’s
work	is	in	danger	of	being	misunderstood	if	examined	purely	as	a	contribution	to	social	or	political	theory.	It	should
be	understood	as	the	work	of	a	jurist	seeking	to	grasp	the	nexus	between	the	legal	and	the	political	for	the	purpose
of	specifying	the	nature	of	modern	public	law.
This	point	takes	us	only	so	far.	If	law	is	not	to	be	treated	as	an	autonomous	discipline	and	if	the	legal	is	to	be
derived	from	the	political,	then	the	scientific	inquiry	is	simply	pushed	back	one	stage	further.	The	question
becomes:	how	is	the	autonomy	of	the	political	to	be	explained?	This	is	the	deeper	question	that	needs	to	be
examined	if	Schmitt’s	contribution	to	politonomy	is	to	be	assessed.	In	what	respect,	it	might	be	asked,	does	Schmitt
offer	an	account	of	the	law	of	the	political?
State	Theory
Schmitt’s	scholarship	must	first	be	situated	within	the	German	tradition	of	Staatslehre.	During	the	eighteenth	and
nineteenth	centuries,	this	doctrine	of	the	state	presented	itself	as	a	single	discipline	that	embraced	political	theory,
sociology,	and	law	and	aimed	to	offer	a	scientific	understanding	of	the	modern	institution	of	the	state	(Kersten
2000).	Schmitt	acknowledges	the	importance	of	this	movement	but	maintains	that	ever	since	the	establishment	of
the	German	Reich	in	the	1870s	there	had	been	a	progressive	“decline	of	consciousness	in	the	field	of	state
theory”	(1930,	14).	This	he	attributes	to	the	growing	influence	of	positivist	ideas	in	public	law.	Under	the	influence
of	positivist	public	lawyers	such	as	Gerber	and	Laband,	a	new	conceptualization	of	the	subject	held	sway,	in	which
all	questions	of	history	and	politics	were	expelled	from	juristic	consideration.	The	state	was	refashioned	as	a	purely
legal	institution	equipped	with	a	special	type	of	corporate	personality;	it	was	thus	deemed	to	be	an	institution
created	by,	and	regulated	in	accordance	with,	the	operations	of	positive	public	law	(Gerber	1865;	Laband	1876–
82;	Stolleis	2001,	ch.	8).	Schmitt	argues	that,	under	the	pervasive	influence	of	these	ideas,	by	1914	the	great
tradition	of	state	theory	that	had	been	developed	over	the	previous	two	or	three	hundred	years	had	been	lost	(16).
No	longer	could	any	systematic	and	scientific	account	of	public	law	be	offered	if	it	started	by	postulating	the
authority	of	(the	positivist	conception	of)	the	state.
For	Schmitt,	the	state	is	a	modern	institution	that	came	into	existence	through	intense	political	struggle.	“The	state
that	came	into	being	in	the	seventeenth	century	and	prevailed	on	the	continent	of	Europe,”	he	explains,	“differs
from	all	earlier	kinds	of	political	units”	([1932]	2007,	34;	see	also	1941).	Understood	as	an	“organized	political
entity,	internally	peaceful,	territorially	enclosed,	and	impenetrable	to	aliens,”	he	recognizes	that	the	creation	of	this
institution	amounts	to	a	specific	historic	achievement	([1932]	2007,	47).	Conceived	as	the	outcome	of	struggle,	its
authority	could	not	be	taken	for	granted.	Consequently,	in	the	specific	context	of	a	crisis	such	as	existed	in	the
Weimar	Republic,	in	which	conditions	of	internal	peace	had	not	been	established,	the	account	of	that	regime’s
system	of	public	law	could	not	commence	by	assuming	the	authority	of	the	state.	A	scientific	account	of	public	law
had	to	be	constructed	from	more	basic	elements	of	political	understanding.
It	is	for	this	reason	that	Schmitt	famously	proclaims	that	the	“concept	of	the	state	presupposes	the	concept	of	the
3
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political”	([1932]	2007,	19).	In	the	political	circumstances	prevailing	in	the	Weimar	Republic	during	the	1920s,	it
was	evident	that	the	logic	of	friend–enemy—Schmitt’s	criterion	of	the	political—not	only	manifested	itself	externally,
that	is,	with	respect	to	interstate	conflicts,	but	also	emerged	as	a	feature	of	the	internal	dynamics	of	the	political
unit.	In	such	circumstances,	Schmitt	argues,	a	scientific	account	of	public	law	could	not	be	constructed	on	a
foundation	that	assumed	the	authority	of	either	the	constitution	or	the	state.	A	foundational	account	must	first	offer
an	explanation	of	the	relationship	between	the	legal	and	the	political.
The	account	Schmitt	presents	is	arguably	as	systematic	and	as	radical	as	that	of	Thomas	Hobbes,	who	had	given
us	an	image	of	life	in	the	state	of	nature—which	he	characterized	as	that	of	a	“war	of	all	against	all”—as	the
platform	on	which	he	might	devise	a	rational	solution	to	the	problem	of	order.	Conscious	of	the	conditions	of	life	in	a
state	of	nature,	where	insecurity	reigns	and	force	and	fraud	are	the	cardinal	virtues,	we	are	impelled	to	see	the
necessity,	as	a	matter	of	self-preservation,	of	giving	up	our	natural	liberties	and	trading	them	for	the	protections
offered	by	an	absolute	sovereign	(Hobbes	[1651]	1996,	ch.	13).	For	Hobbes,	the	bargain	to	be	struck	is	that
between	living	free	in	a	world	of	interminable	conflict	and	living	in	peaceful	conditions	under	the	protection	of	a
sovereign	authority.	In	Hobbes’s	estimation,	this	bargain	constitutes	the	fundamental	law	of	the	political.
From	Schmitt’s	perspective,	however,	the	stark	contrast	Hobbes	had	drawn	between	life	in	a	state	of	nature	and	life
under	civil	order	reveals	his	account	to	be	a	formal	legal	exercise.	If	the	concept	of	the	political	is	derived	from	the
existence	of	a	distinction	between	friend	and	enemy,	then	the	transition	Hobbes	envisages	from	the	state	of	nature,
in	which	everyone	is	a	potential	enemy,	to	the	civil	state,	in	which	all	are	bound	to	the	sovereign’s	rule,	is	a
transition	that	negates—or	at	least	entirely	externalizes—politics.	Hobbes	would	appear	to	have	given	us	a	purely
juristic	concept	of	the	state,	in	which	the	sovereign–subject	relationship	is	conceived	in	entirely	formal	terms.	Since
all	honor	and	all	power	are	vested	in	the	office	of	the	sovereign,	Hobbes	evidently	had	no	place	for	political
struggle	within	the	state.	His	theory	is	a	juridical	account	that	is	antipolitical	in	character	(Strauss	1932,	108n2).
For	Schmitt,	the	contrast	Hobbes	drew	between	war	(in	a	state	of	nature)	and	peace	(in	the	state)	is	formal,
abstract,	and	general.	If	political	jurists	are	to	acquire	scientific	knowledge	of	the	institution	of	the	state,	they	are
obliged	to	have	regard	to	the	existential	conditions	under	which	the	authority	of	the	state	is	established	and
maintained.	He	asserts	that	in	reality	the	state	is	able	to	assure	“total	peace	within	…	its	territory”	and	to	establish
itself	as	“the	decisive	political	entity”	only	through	a	historic	struggle	involving	violence	and	domination	([1932]
2007,	46).	Only	through	such	a	process,	argues	Schmitt,	could	a	“normal	situation,”	which	is	“the	pre-requisite	for
legal	norms	to	be	valid,”	be	established	(46).	Since	tensions	and	conflicts	continue	to	exist	even	in	a	well-ordered
state,	he	recognizes	that	“this	requirement	for	internal	peace	compels	it	[the	state]	in	critical	situations	to	decide
also	upon	the	domestic	enemy”	(46).	He	gives	this	as	the	reason	that	the	sovereign	power	of	decision	must	be
retained	to	ensure	the	preservation	of	a	constitutional	state	(47).	Sovereign,	Schmitt	declares,	is	“he	who	decides
on	the	exception”	([1922]	2005,	5).
These	political	necessities	are	assumed	to	be	of	profound	juristic	significance.	Any	attempt	to	hide	them	behind
abstract	concepts	or	formal	techniques	leads	only	to	a	distortion	of	the	nature	of	public	law.	Schmitt	of	course
recognizes	that	within	any	well-ordered	state	law	has	“its	own	relatively	independent	domain”	([1932]	2007,	66).
The	critical	point	is	that	although	positive	law	might	indeed	occupy	a	relatively	independent	domain,	it	loses	that
autonomy	the	closer	it	intrudes	on	political	matters.	This	is	because	political	conflicts	“can	neither	be	decided	by	a
previously	determined	general	norm	nor	by	the	judgment	of	a	disinterested	and	therefore	neutral	third	party”	(27;
see	also	1931).	Only	the	politically	engaged	parties	can	settle	an	extreme	case	of	conflict.	If	there	is	a	threat	to
political	existence	then,	even	in	a	constitutional	state	“the	battle	must	then	be	waged	outside	the	constitution	and
the	law”	([1932]	2007,	47).	This	is	because	“unity	and	order	lies	in	the	political	existence	of	the	state,	not	in
statutes,	rules,	and	just	any	instrument	containing	norms”	(65).	For	Schmitt,	the	most	fundamental	concept	that
grounds	the	modern	understanding	of	law	is	neither	the	constitution	nor	the	state:	it	is	the	concept	of	the	political.
The	Law	of	the	Political
In	Political	Theology,	Schmitt	observes	that	“all	law	is	situational	law”	([1922]	2005,	13).	Given	that	he	also
proposes	that	the	concept	of	the	political	grounds	the	meaning	of	the	modern	concept	of	law,	it	is	evident	that
whatever	meaning	might	be	ascribed	to	the	law	of	the	political	it	is	not	a	reference	to	positive	law.	This	notion	can
be	addressed	only	in	the	context	of	the	broader	tradition	of	public	law	as	political	jurisprudence.
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From	this	perspective,	the	concept	of	the	law	of	the	political	must	refer	to	the	laws,	rules,	and	conditions	that
express	and	sustain	the	autonomy	of	the	political.	As	has	been	indicated,	public	law	in	its	broader	conception	is
concerned	with	the	rules,	principles,	canons,	and	maxims	that	condition	and	sustain	the	activity	of	governing.
These	various	rules	might	now	be	divided	into	two	main	parts:	constitutive	rules	and	regulative	rules.	The	former
are	those	that	establish	a	conceptual	understanding	of	the	political	as	a	distinctive	way	of	gaining	knowledge	of	the
world,	whereas	the	latter	are	those	by	which	the	power	of	this	way	of	acting	in	the	world	is	sustained.	For	Bodin,
who	Schmitt	acknowledges	as	having	given	us	“the	first	depiction	of	modern	public	law”	([1928]	2008,	101),”	the
constitutive	rules	are	those	that	elaborate	his	concept	of	sovereignty,	whereas	the	regulative	rules	are	those	that
elaborate	the	principle	that	restraints	on	power	generate	power	(Bodin	[1576]	1962;	Loughlin	2010,	62–70).	The
question	is:	does	Schmitt	acknowledge	the	existence	of	any	such	basic	rules	that	constitute	the	political?
To	address	this	question,	Schmitt’s	understanding	of	the	concept	of	the	political	must	first	be	unpacked.	Schmitt
argues	that	the	political	acquires	its	specificity	in	contrast	to	other	“relatively	independent	endeavours	of	human
thought	and	action,	particularly	the	moral,	aesthetic	and	economic”	([1932]	2007,	25–26).	The	essential	criterion	of
the	political	is	found	in	a	binary	distinction	that	is	not	reducible	to	other	contrasts.	This	is	the	friend–enemy
distinction.	Two	aspects	of	this	criterion	might	be	emphasized.	The	first	is	that	the	friend–enemy	distinction	should
not	be	understood	metaphorically:	it	has	an	existential	meaning.	Second,	the	political	does	not	have	a	substance.
That	is,	the	political	is	not	located	in	some	discrete	sector	of	social	life	called	the	political	sphere;	it	is	capable	of
manifesting	itself	in	any	aspect	of	group	existence.	The	autonomous	character	of	the	political	is	thus	founded	on
two	basic	conditions:	first,	the	fact	that	existential	conflicts	emerge	and	divide	humans	according	to	the	criterion	of
friend–enemy;	and,	second,	that	this	criterion	is	formed	as	a	consequence	of	there	existing	a	particular	“intensity
of	an	association	or	dissociation	of	human	beings”	(38).
The	conjunction	of	an	existential	meaning	given	to	the	concept	of	the	political	when	combined	with	the	lack	of	any
constituted	sphere	of	this	autonomous	practice	would	appear	to	suggest	that	there	is	not	much	on	which	any	basic
law	of	the	political	might	found	itself.	In	Schmitt’s	analysis,	conflicts	can	arise	in	any	social	situation:	they	arise	for	a
variety	of	unpredictable	reasons,	and	they	draw	on	a	wide	range	of	sources—theological,	economic,	ethnic,	or
cultural.	It	is	difficult	to	see	how	any	form	of	predictability,	let	alone	normative	rationality,	can	apply	to	this
dimension	of	human	experience.
This	would	suggest	that	Schmitt	treats	friend–enemy	conflicts	simply	as	an	existential	condition	on	which	no	further
intellectual	energy	need	be	expended.	Before	yielding	to	this	position,	it	should	be	noted	that	Schmitt	believes	that
the	friend–enemy	criterion	has	a	distinctive	meaning.	It	is,	he	states,	an	entirely	collective	matter	and	also	a	public
matter.	That	is,	the	criterion	should	not	be	understood	“in	a	private-individualistic	sense	as	a	psychological
expression	of	private	emotions	and	tendencies”	([1932]	2007,	28).	The	enemy	“is	solely	the	public	enemy	…	The
enemy	is	hostis,	not	inimicus…”	(28).	The	enemy	is	not	merely	a	competitor,	nor	is	it	a	private	adversary:	“the
enemy	is	solely	the	public	enemy,	because	everything	that	has	a	relationship	to	such	a	collectivity	of	men,
particularly	to	a	whole	nation,	becomes	public	by	virtue	of	such	a	relationship”	(28).	Elaborating,	he	explains	that
“an	organized	political	entity”—that	is,	a	state—must	“decide	for	itself	the	friend–enemy	distinction”	(29–30).
Schmitt’s	account	might	be	ambiguous,	but	it	does	indicate	two	things.	It	suggests,	first,	that	the	political	is	a
bounded	concept:	it	is	bounded	in	that	it	is	a	distinction	pertaining	to	a	group	and	that	this	group	has	a	public
identity.	The	concept	of	the	political	must	therefore,	in	some	sense,	be	constituted	by	the	criteria	that	enable	us	to
identify	a	group	as	a	group,	as	an	organized	political	entity.	It	is	also	constituted	by	factors	that	enable	us	to
distinguish	between	public	and	private	concerns.	These	features	suggest	the	formation	of	an	institution	(Searle
2005).	If	the	constituent	nature	of	this	institution	could	be	specified,	then	Schmitt’s	law	of	the	political	would	be
revealed.	This,	however,	is	not	straightforward.	This	is	so	mainly	because	Schmitt	doubts	the	capacity	of	general
concepts	to	govern	conduct,	and	he	also	doubts	the	value	of	undertaking	general	methodological	inquiries	(see
Müller	1999,	63).	Nonetheless,	it	should	be	emphasized	that	Schmitt	treats	the	friend–enemy	distinction	as	the
essential	criterion	of	the	concept	of	the	political.
Schmitt’s	political	realism	leads	him	to	claim	that	political	and	legal	concepts	acquire	meaning	only	when	situated	in
a	specific	historical	context.	Concept	formation	is	regarded	as	an	immanent	process	that	arises	from	an	actual
political	situation.	“All	political	concepts,	images	and	terms,”	he	suggests,	“have	a	polemical	meaning.”	By	this	he
means	primarily	that	they	“are	focused	on	a	specific	conflict	and	are	bound	to	a	concrete	situation	whose	ultimate
consequence	(which	manifests	itself	in	war	or	revolution)	is	a	friend–enemy	grouping”	([1932]	2007,	30).	As	he
Politonomy
Page 6 of 16
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the l icence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: London School of Economics and Political Science; date: 27 May 2015
explains	in	The	Concept	of	the	Political:	“words	such	as	state,	republic,	society,	class,	as	well	as	sovereignty,
constitutional	state,	absolutism,	dictatorship,	economic	planning,	neutral	or	total	state,	and	so	on,	are
incomprehensible	if	one	does	not	know	exactly	who	is	to	be	affected,	combated,	refuted,	or	negated	by	such	a
term”	(30–31).	His	general	point	is	that,	devoid	of	reference	to	such	antagonisms,	concepts	become	meaningless
abstractions.	“The	critical	moment	in	the	history	of	a	concept,”	Schmitt	suggests,	“is	the	moment	in	which	its
adversary	is	forgotten”	(1930,	17;	see	also	1931,	128;	[1933]	1988,	191).
Schmitt	therefore	maintains	that	both	the	nature	and	content	of	a	concept	are	determined	by	the	existence	of	a
concrete	antithesis.	Generalizations	are	deceptive	since	abstract	concepts	do	not	carry	an	independent	authority.
For	Schmitt,	it	would	appear,	concepts	are	either	somehow	found	in	a	concrete	reality	or	are	tools	to	be	used	as
weapons	in	the	struggle	for	power.	In	most	cases,	as	Jan	Müller	explains,	“the	exigencies	of	ideological	combat	and
a	strategic	politics	of	concepts	(Begriffspolitik)	tended	to	override	Schmitt’s	Wissenschaftlichkeit”	(1999,	62).
Schmitt’s	method	must	of	necessity	extend	to	the	concept	of	the	political	itself.	Consequently,	if	there	is	a	law	of	the
political,	it	cannot	be	founded	on	the	appeal	of	some	concept,	whether	of	sovereignty,	universal	right,	or	the
elaboration	of	the	general	will.	This	line	of	analysis	might	suggest	that	Schmitt	held	to	the	crude	realist	notion	that
might	makes	right	and	that	that	is	all	there	is	to	say	about	the	law	of	the	political.
That	is	a	conclusion	that	should	be	resisted,	however,	on	the	ground	that	in	other	writings	Schmitt	adopted	a	more
nuanced	position.	In	these	contributions,	he	rejects	the	claim	that	concepts	are	merely	the	products	of	an	extant
political	reality.	In	various	essays,	he	recognizes	that	political	struggles	are	invariably	fought	out	through	concepts
and	that	these	conceptual	struggles	are	not	entirely	derivative.	That	is,	they	“are	not	merely	‘ideological’	delusions
serving	only	propaganda	purposes”	([1932]	1988,	163).	Rather,	they	are	“only	a	case	in	point	of	the	simple	truth
that	all	human	activity	bears	a	certain	intellectual	(geistigen)	character”	(163).	Even	in	the	context	of	political
struggle,	he	acknowledges	that	there	“has	never	in	human	history	been	an	absence	of	such	justifications	and
principles	of	legitimation”	(163).	Concepts,	he	seems	to	be	saying,	are	drawn	into	conflictual	struggle	and	used	as
weapons	in	those	struggles,	but	they	are	not	purely	the	product	of	these	struggles.	Rather,	these	power	conflicts
need	to	be	legitimated	through	concepts	at	the	level	of	political	and	constitutional	theory	(Bolsinger	2001,	37–40).
Schmitt	thus	seems	not	to	be	entirely	consistent	in	his	analysis	of	the	significance	of	concepts	and	this	makes	it
difficult	to	assess	his	stance	on	politonomy.	He	says	both	that	“the	content	of	world	history	…	has	always	been	a
struggle	for	words	and	concepts”	([1933]	1988,	191)	and	that	the	“struggle	over	concepts	is	not	a	dispute	about
empty	words	but	a	war	of	enormous	reality	and	presence”	(198).	But	he	also	claims	that	the	key	point	is	“who
interprets,	defines	and	applies	them”	(1932,	179).	Contrary	to	many	political	jurists,	he	asserts	that	in	fact	“Caesar
dominus	et	supra	grammaticam.	The	emperor	is	also	ruler	over	grammar”	(179;	cf.	Kant	[1784]	1991,	58;	see	also
Loughlin	2010,	178–180).	If	grammar	is	taken	to	be	a	metaphorical	expression	of	the	law	of	the	political,	then
Schmitt	appears	to	be	saying	that	the	sovereign	determines	not	just	the	exception	but	also	the	political	itself.
Our	grasp	of	Schmitt’s	position	with	respect	to	the	significance	of	concepts	in	understanding	the	phenomenon	of
the	political	might	be	advanced	once	his	argument	is	situated	within	that	of	the	German	school	of
Begriffsgeschichte.	This	body	of	work,	exemplified	in	the	writings	of	Reinhart	Koselleck,	follows	in	the	tradition	of
Schmitt.	Their	argument	on	the	nature	of	concepts	is	insightful.	Koselleck	maintains	that,	whatever	else	it	might	be,
a	concept	“bundles	up	the	variety	of	historical	experience	together	with	a	collection	of	theoretical	and	practical
references	into	a	relation	that	is	given	and	can	be	experienced	only	through	the	concept”	(2004,	85;	emphasis
added).	Koselleck	acknowledges	that	social	and	political	concepts	do	not	simply	“define	given	states	of	affairs”;
they	aim	in	themselves	to	shape	a	state	of	affairs	and	thus	to	“reach	into	the	future”	(80).	In	this	respect,	he	states,
“a	concept	must	remain	ambiguous	in	order	to	be	a	concept,”	because	a	political	concept	is	of	necessity	“the
concentrate	of	several	substantial	meanings”	(85).	The	claim	that	political	concepts	remain	intrinsically	contestable
but	have	become	the	medium	through	which	political	struggles	are	fought	out	fits	one	strand	of	Schmitt’s	analysis.
It	also	suggests	that	there	is	a	conceptual	frame	through	which	the	political	is	engaged.
The	ambiguous	nature	of	Schmitt’s	position	on	the	conceptual	frame	of	the	political	casts	a	shadow	over	his	work
as	an	exercise	of	politonomy.	Some	believe	this	is	an	ambiguity	he	was	content	not	only	to	maintain	but	also	to
exploit	(see	Müller	1999).	From	the	juristic	perspective,	it	might	be	said	that	this	ambiguity	flows	from	his	reticence
on	whether	there	are	in	fact	two	different	concepts	of	power	at	play	in	the	domain	of	the	political.	In	this	domain,
power	not	only	signifies	supremacy	over	the	material	means	of	rule	(potentia)	but	also	refers	to	the	capacity	to
build	unity	through	the	establishment	of	authority	(potestas)	(Loughlin	2010,	164–177).	Schmitt	speaks	mainly	of
4
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the	former	aspect	of	power,	on	which	he	maintains	a	realist	position.	But	occasionally,	as	in	an	early	work	in	which
he	suggests	that	“to	the	political	belongs	the	idea,	because	there	is	no	politics	without	authority	and	no	authority
without	an	ethos	of	belief”	(1996,	17),	he	is	alluding	to	the	idea	of	power	as	potestas.	And	when	he	invokes	the
idea	of	power	as	potestas,	it	might	be	emphasized	that	Schmitt	is	obliged	to	acknowledge	the	power-shaping
capacity	of	concepts.
Institutionalism
To	take	forward	this	analysis,	it	is	necessary	to	shift	register	and	directly	address	Schmitt’s	concept	of	law.	As	we
have	seen,	he	regarded	all	concepts	of	law	as	being	historically	situated.	During	the	1920s,	Schmitt’s	primary	task
was	to	carry	through	a	critique	of	the	ahistorical	abstractions	of	legal	normativism.	His	basic	thesis	is	that,	by
severing	the	norms	of	legal	ordering	from	the	facts	of	political	existence,	normativist	jurists	distort	understanding	of
the	true	nature	of	law	(see,	e.g.,	[1922]	2005,	ch.	2).	In	its	place,	Schmitt	promotes	a	type	of	legal	decisionism.
Law,	he	argues,	is	essentially	the	product	of	will.	In	particular,	the	existence	of	a	sovereign	act	of	will	can	never	be
eliminated	from	the	sphere	of	legal	thought.	In	support	of	this	argument,	Schmitt	seeks	to	show	how	normativist
jurists,	being	interested	only	in	the	normal	situation,	are	unable	to	account	for	exceptional	circumstances.	The
norm	may	be	destroyed	in	such	exceptional	circumstances,	he	explains,	but	the	exception	remains	of	juristic
significance:	“both	elements,	the	norm	as	well	as	the	decision,	remain	within	the	framework	of	the	juristic”	([1922]
2005,	12–13).
In	his	Preface	to	the	second	edition	of	Political	Theology	in	1933,	Schmitt	begins	to	modify	this	claim.	He	writes,	“I
now	distinguish	not	two	but	three	types	of	legal	thinking;	in	addition	to	the	normativist	and	the	decisionist	types
there	is	the	institutional	one”	([1922]	2005,	2).	“Whereas	the	pure	normativist	thinks	in	terms	of	impersonal	rules,
and	the	decisionist	implements	the	good	law	of	the	correctly	recognized	political	situation	by	means	of	a	personal
decision,”	Schmitt	explains	that	“institutional	legal	thinking	unfolds	in	institutions	and	organizations	that	transcend
the	personal	sphere”	(3).	It	is	evident	that	Schmitt’s	advocacy	of	institutionalism	is	designed	to	grasp	“the	stable
content	inherent	in	every	great	political	movement”	(3).	If,	as	he	is	now	claiming,	there	is	an	inherent	element	that
provides	stability	to	political	unity,	what	might	this	be?	And,	most	importantly,	does	this	element	provide	the	key	to
Schmitt’s	politonomy?
Schmitt’s	institutional	argument	is	most	clearly	presented	in	his	1934	book	On	the	Three	Types	of	Juristic	Thought
([1934]	2004).	In	this	work,	Schmitt	explains	that	all	legal	theories	comprise	three	basic	elements:	norm;	decision;
and	concrete-order	formation.	Legal	theories	are	thus	to	be	categorized	according	to	the	emphasis	they	place	on
each	of	these	elements.	Further,	the	type	of	political	regime	envisaged	in	this	theory	is	invariably	linked	to	the
predominance	given	to	one	or	other	of	these	elements.	“Every	form	of	political	life,”	he	maintains,	“stands	in	direct,
mutual	relationship	with	the	specific	mode	of	thought	and	argumentation	of	legal	life”	(45).	In	this	work,	Schmitt
again	criticizes	normativism,	but	he	also	argues	against	the	decisionism	he	seemed	to	be	advocating	in	Political
Theology.	He	argues	instead	in	favor	of	a	type	of	institutionalism	that	he	calls	concrete-order	thinking.
Normativists	promote	a	purely	conceptualistic	understanding	of	law,	law	as	a	set	of	rules.	The	arguments	of
decisionists,	by	contrast,	are	reduced	ultimately	to	factual	analysis.	Institutionalism,	or	concrete-order	thinking,	is
Schmitt’s	attempt	to	finesse	the	distinction	between	normativity	and	facticity	([1934]	2004,	53).	Rules	and	decisions
are	integral	parts	of	legal	order,	but	they	carry	meaning	only	as	formulations	of	concrete	order.	Law	as	norm	does
not	yield	sound	jurisprudence	because	a	norm	“cannot	apply,	administer,	or	enforce	itself”	(51),	and	decisionism	is
not	sustainable	because	a	legal	decision	does	not	spring	from	a	normative	vacuum	([1922]	2005,	62).	Legal	order
is	maintained	as	an	expression	of	the	underlying	concrete	order.	Rules	and	decisions	achieve	regularity	by
reliance	on	“concepts	of	what,	in	itself,	is	normal,	the	normal	type	and	the	normal	situation”	([1922]	2005,	54).
Schmitt	is	therefore	arguing	that	political	unity	is	maintained	only	if	there	is	a	stable	institutional	structure	in	place,
that	is,	that	there	is	a	concrete	order	that	determines	the	meaning	of	legal	norms	and	guides	the	exercise	of	legal
decision-making.	The	question	is:	How	is	a	stable	institutional	structure	established	and	maintained?
With	this	question	in	mind,	we	turn	to	Chapter	13	of	Schmitt’s	Constitutional	Theory,	on	the	Rechtsstaat	([1928]
2008).	His	analysis	of	the	nature	of	the	Rechtsstaat	follows	what	by	now	will	be	a	familiar	trajectory.	He	maintains
that	to	invoke	the	idea	of	“the	rule	of	law”	is	“an	empty	manner	of	speaking	if	it	does	not	receive	its	actual	sense
through	a	certain	opposition”	(181).	For	Schmitt,	the	Rechtsstaat	is	a	legislative	state,	that	is,	a	state	in	which	the
5
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authoritative	expression	of	will	takes	the	form	of	legislation	and	the	legislature	is	itself	bound	by	this	law.	This
makes	sense,	he	explains,	only	when	a	statute	is	expressed	in	the	form	of	a	general	norm.	The	idea	of	the	rule	of
law	thus	gestures	toward	the	notion	that	law	is	not	to	be	understood	as	voluntas	(i.e.,	will	or	decision)	but	as	ratio
(i.e.,	norms	or	rules).	Schmitt	contends	that	the	problem	with	this	claim	is	that	within	any	actually	existing
constitutional	order	the	Rechtsstaat	concept	of	law	must	be	situated	alongside	an	alternative	concept	of	law,	what
he	calls	a	political	concept	of	law.	This	political	concept	remains	a	juristic	concept:	both	form	essential	elements	in
modern	constitutional	thought.
By	a	political	concept	of	law,	Schmitt	means	a	concept	of	law	that	“results	from	the	political	form	of	existence	of	the
state”	and	arises	“out	of	the	concrete	manner	of	the	formation	of	the	organisation	of	rule”	([1928]	2008a,	187).	In
the	Rechtsstaat	concept,	law	is	essentially	a	norm—a	rule	of	a	general	character.	In	the	political	concept,	law	is	the
expression	of	a	concrete	will;	it	takes	the	form	of	a	command	and	is	conceived	as	an	act	of	sovereignty.	The
Rechtsstaat,	he	argues,	seeks	to	suppress	this	political	concept	and	establish	a	sovereignty	of	law,	but	this	is	a
vain	hope:	without	this	political	expression	of	law	as	will	the	Rechtsstaat	formulation	cannot	exist.
Schmitt’s	analysis	in	Constitutional	Theory	emphasizes	the	dependence	of	norm	on	will.	But	in	the	light	of	his	later
argument	about	concrete-order	thinking,	it	can	be	said	that	law	as	norm	and	law	as	will	both	rest	on	institutional
ordering.	He	alludes	to	this	point	in	chapter	13	of	Constitutional	Theory	when	he	states	that	those	who	promote	the
concept	of	law	as	norm	find	themselves	in	a	contradictory	and	confused	position	because	“that	which	is	directly
lacking	is	the	nomos”	([1928]	2008,	184).	Only	in	1950,	when	he	published	The	Nomos	of	the	Earth,	does	he	offer
a	systematic	account	of	this	crucial	concept	([1950]	2006).
Nomos
Schmitt’s	objective	in	The	Nomos	of	the	Earth	is	to	specify	the	original	legal-constitutional	meaning	of	nomos	“in	its
energy	and	majesty”	([1950]	2006-,	67)	to	demonstrate	how	jurists	who	translate	nomos	simply	as	law	or,	if	they
try	to	differentiate	it	from	written	law	by	defining	it	as	custom,	do	not	get	to	the	root	of	the	matter.	In	this	sense,	he
seeks	to	elaborate	on	the	meaning	of	nomos	for	the	purpose	of	exposing	a	concept	of	law	founded	in	concrete-
order	thinking.
The	Greek	noun	nomos,	Schmitt	explains,	derives	from	the	Greek	verb	nemein,	and,	in	common	acceptance,
nemein	has	three	main	meanings	(in	German):	nehmen	(to	appropriate),	teilen	(to	divide)	and	weiden	(to	pasture).
In	its	first	meaning	it	signifies	a	taking,	especially	a	land	appropriation.	This	forms	the	basis	of	the	history	of	every
settled	people	and	“not	only	logically,	but	also	historically,	land-appropriation	precedes	the	order	that	follows	from
it”	([1950]	2006,	48).	Nomos	thus	signifies	the	constitution	of	“the	original	spatial	order,	the	source	of	all	further
concrete	order	and	all	further	law”	(48)	The	constitutive	process	of	a	land-acquisition	“is	found	at	the	beginning	of
the	history	of	every	settled	people,	every	commonwealth,	every	empire”	(48).	Schmitt	contends	that	“all
subsequent	law	and	everything	promulgated	and	enacted	thereafter	as	decrees	and	commands	are	nourished	…
by	this	source”	(48).
Nomos	is	an	ordo	ordinans,	an	order	of	ordering,	that	performs	the	constitutive	act	of	establishing	a	spatially
determined	regime	of	rule.	In	the	beginning,	order	was	not	established	on	the	basis	of	consent	or	on	some
universal	principle,	or	a	basic	norm.	In	the	beginning,	there	was	a	land-grab,	and	only	after	the	violence	of	that
initial	appropriation	and	division	had	been	completed	could	“some	degree	of	calculability	and	security”	be
achieved	and	nomos	emerge	as	the	expression	of	order	([1950]	2006,	341).	This	order	evolves;	it	is	not	fully
formed	at	the	foundation,	though	it	remains	nourished	by	this	source.	Nomos,	it	would	appear,	holds	the	key	to
politonomy:	it	is	an	expression	of	the	basic	law	of	the	political.
For	Schmitt,	the	law	of	the	political	is	revealed	through	the	way	the	processes	of	appropriation,	division,	and
production	give	rise	to	a	substantive	order	of	a	political	unity.	Once	this	is	grasped,	the	relation	between	nomos,
state,	and	constitution	becomes	clear.	For	Schmitt,	the	state	is	“the	concrete,	collective	condition	of	political	unity”
([1928]	2008,	60);	in	modernity,	it	becomes	the	“master	ordering	concept”	of	this	political	unity	(1941,	375). 	It	is
similarly	clear	that	Schmitt’s	concept	of	constitution	(in	its	absolute	sense)	differs	from	the	notion	of	constitutional
law	as	that	enacted	in	modern	documentary	form.	Since	the	order	that	emerges	within	the	state	arises	from	“a	pre-
established,	unified	will”	([1928]	2008,	65),	Schmitt	argues	that	the	state	“does	not	have	a	constitution”;	rather,
“the	state	is	constitution”	(60).	In	this	sense,	the	state/constitution	is	“an	actually	present	condition,	a	status	of
6
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unity	and	order”	(60).	The	basic	law	of	the	state	finds	its	authoritative	expression	not	in	enacted	legal	norms	but	in
“the	political	existence	of	the	state”	(65).	Once	brought	into	alignment	it	is	evident	that	state	(the	political	unity),
constitution	(the	status	of	unity	and	order),	and	nomos	(the	order	of	a	concrete	spatial	unity)	are,	for	all	intents	and
purposes,	synonyms.
Schmitt	recognizes	that,	like	nomos,	state	and	constitution	continue	to	evolve:	the	state	expresses	“the	principle	of
the	dynamic	emergence	of	political	unity,	of	the	process	of	constantly	renewed	formation	and	emergence	of	this
unity	from	a	fundamental	or	ultimately	effective	power	and	energy”	([1928]	2008?,	61).	And	he	accepts	that	the
“continuity	of	a	constitution	is	manifest	as	long	as	the	regress	to	this	primary	appropriation	is	recognizable	and
recognized”	([1950]	2006,	326n6).	If	state	highlights	unity	and	constitution	the	form	of	that	unity,	then	nomos
accentuates	the	motive	forces	that	shape	the	form	of	that	unity:	it	is	“the	full	immediacy	of	a	legal	power	not
mediated	by	laws;	it	is	a	constitutive	historical	event—an	act	of	legitimacy,	whereby	the	legality	of	a	mere	law	first
is	made	meaningful”	([1950]	2006,	73).	It	is	the	law	of	the	political.
Schmitt’s	institutionalism	brings	his	legal	thought	much	closer	to	Hegel’s	legal	and	political	philosophy,	in	which
“the	state	is	a	‘form	(Gestalt),	which	is	the	complete	realization	of	the	spirit	in	being	(Dasein)’;	an	‘individual
totality,’	a	Reich	of	objective	reason	and	morality”	([1934]2004,	78).	This	type	of	state,	he	emphasizes,	is	not	an
“order	of	a	calculable	and	enforceable	legal	functionalism”	(i.e.,	the	product	of	decisionism),	nor	is	it	a	“norm	of
norms”	(normativism);	instead,	it	“is	the	concrete	order	of	orders,	the	institution	of	institutions”	(78–79).	But	it
should	be	emphasized	that	this	is	not	Hegel’s	state	in	which	the	universal	is	willed;	it	more	closely	approximates	his
concept	of	Notstaat,	the	state	based	on	necessity,	an	expression	of	the	form	within	civil	society	“wherein	the
livelihood,	happiness,	and	legal	status	of	one	man	is	interwoven	with	the	livelihood,	happiness,	and	rights	of	all”
(Hegel,	[1820]	1952,	§183).
For	Schmitt,	then,	it	seems	evident	that	politonomy	is	founded	on	the	concept	of	nomos.	In	The	Nomos	of	the	Earth
he	shows	the	distinctive	contribution	that	nomos	makes	to	the	establishment	of	political	order.	The	most	basic	claim
is	that	law	is	tied	to	space,	that	is,	to	a	defined	and	bounded	territory	that	distinguishes	inside	and	outside.	Without
this	boundary,	there	can	be	no	domain	of	the	political.	In	this	respect,	it	might	be	said	that	nomos	is	constitutive	of
the	political.	This	space—this	territory—is	not	merely	a	geographical	notion.	It	is	also	a	legal	and	political	concept
that	concerns	“the	space	between	individuals	in	a	group	whose	members	are	bound	to,	and	at	the	same	time
separated	and	protected	from,	each	other	by	all	kinds	of	relationships,	based	on	a	common	language,	religion,	a
common	history,	customs	and	laws”	(Arendt	1965,	262).	The	establishment	of	these	relationships	creates	the
space	of	political	freedom.	This	freedom	is	always	spatially	limited,	always	an	achievement,	and	always	ordered.
Nomos	gives	expression	to	that	concrete	order:	an	order	initiated	by	a	taking	(involving	force)	and	subsequently
harnessed	through	institutionalization.
Schmitt’s	Contribution	to	Politonomy
Schmitt’s	contribution	to	politonomy	can	now	be	specified.	As	already	noted,	he	is	to	be	situated	within	a	tradition
of	understanding	public	law	as	political	jurisprudence.	This	body	of	thought	recognizes	the	necessity	of	addressing
the	relationship	between	the	legal	within	the	political	for	the	purpose	of	explaining	the	constitution	of	modern
political	authority.	Rather	than	postulating	the	autonomy	of	law,	thereby	cutting	off	inquiry	into	the	nature	of	the
relationship	between	law	and	politics,	political	jurisprudence	insists	on	the	necessity	of	undertaking	an	inquiry	into
the	character	of	the	fundamental	laws	of	the	political.	In	this	sense,	political	jurisprudence	is	an	alternative
formulation	of	the	discipline	of	politonomy.
The	status	of	this	discipline	within	Western	political	thought	might	now	be	briefly	explained.	This	tradition	of
Western	political	thought	has	evolved	because,	in	the	face	of	the	common	historical	experience	of	living	in	regimes
built	on	conflict,	domination,	and	the	threat	of	disorder,	scholars	have	felt	the	lingering	power	of	an	image	of	human
community	as	an	ordered	and	peaceable	existence.	One	highly	influential	strand	of	political	thought	has	devoted
itself	to	the	task	of	overcoming	that	gulf.	Starting	with	the	Stoics,	embraced	by	medieval	Christian	scholars	and
eventually	secularized	in	Enlightenment	thought,	this	line	of	thought	claims	that	the	laws	of	reason	and	the	laws	of
nature	can	be	revealed	to	operate	in	harmony.	Reconciliation	is	achieved	through	the	realization	of	a	type	of
human	association	made	accessible	to	us	through	the	power	of	reason.	Initially	expressing	an	overarching,
divinely	sanctioned	unity	of	the	world,	in	its	post-theological	phase	it	presents	itself	as	a	set	of	principles	of
Politonomy
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association	that	humans	are	impelled	rationally	to	adopt	and	which	they	must	strive	to	realize.
Politonomy,	by	contrast,	is	founded	in	opposition	to	this	powerful	strand	of	political	thought.	Expressing	skepticism
about	the	possibility	of	achieving	reconciliation	through	transcendence,	politonomy	is	born	of	a	recognition	of	the
essentially	unbridgeable	nature	of	this	gulf	(Hunter	2001).	The	power	of	“abstract	universals”	is	to	be
acknowledged,	but	the	“necessary	conditions”	cannot	be	ignored	(Hegel	1952,	§§29–33;	see	also	Honneth	2010,
15).	Politonomy	appeals	to	reason	but	does	not	seek	an	escape	from	history.	It	often	presents	itself	as	a	practical
discourse	that,	although	orientated	to	norms,	always	has	regard	to	consequences.	Rather	than	advocating
reconciliation	through	the	promotion	of	some	overarching	moral	sensibility,	politonomy	seeks	through
phenomenological	investigation	to	explain	the	immanent	logic	of	political	reason	that	sustains	this	distinctive	way	of
ordering	the	world.
The	first	systematic	exponent	of	this	discipline	was	Jean	Bodin.	He	laid	its	foundations	through	explication	of	the
concept	of	sovereignty.	This	affirmed	the	absolute	authority	of	the	system	of	political	rule	and	thereby	asserted	the
autonomy	of	the	political	domain.	But	he	proceeded	to	build	on	this	foundation	by	carrying	out	an	extensive
comparative	and	historical	inquiry	into	the	governing	practices	of	European	states	to	elaborate	a	set	of	rules	to	be
followed	if	the	prince	was	to	maintain	his	state.	By	bringing	the	concept	of	sovereignty	establishing	the	right	to	rule
into	alignment	with	rules	of	civil	prudence	that	maintained	the	capacity	of	rule,	Bodin	provided	the	basic	template	of
the	discipline	of	public	law	as	political	jurisprudence.	Bodin’s	was	a	major	contribution	to	politonomy.
In	Bodin’s	framework,	the	concept	of	sovereignty	outlined	in	Book	I	and	underpinned	by	the	claim	that	the	prince
possesses	“the	most	high,	absolute,	and	perpetual	power	over	the	citizens	and	subjects	in	a	commonwealth”
([1576]	1962,	84)	specified	the	essential	constitutive	rule	of	the	political	domain.	It	is	sometimes	contended	that
Bodin’s	account	of	sovereignty	is	incoherent,	since	he	claims	that	the	sovereign’s	authority	is	absolute	but	also
subject	to	certain	limitations.	That	view	misconstrues	his	overall	objective.	Bodin	recognizes	two	main	types	of
apparent	limitation:	those	that	concern	the	fundamental	laws	establishing	and	maintaining	the	office	of	the
sovereign;	and	natural	laws,	which	condition	the	sovereign’s	treatment	of	his	subjects.	These,	however,	are	not,
strictly	speaking,	limitations:	they	are	illustrative	of	the	conditions	that	define	the	nature	of	the	office.	Bodin	sees
that	the	autonomy	of	the	political	domain	is	established	as	a	consequence	of	a	distinction	being	drawn	between
public	and	private.
It	should	also	be	noted	that	Book	I	forms	only	one	aspect	of	Bodin’s	overall	objective.	While	it	seeks	to	establish	the
essential	constitutive	rules	of	the	practice,	the	remaining	five	books	outline	the	regulative	rules.	These	are	the	rules
that	the	prince	must	have	regard	if	he	is	to	maintain	his	state.	Drawing	on	historical	illustrations,	Bodin	sketches	the
political	laws	of	governmental	development.	These	include	many	regulative	laws	and	practices	that	have	become
widely	acknowledged:	that	the	separation	of	the	legislative	and	the	executive	power	promotes	liberty	([1576]	1962,
277);	that	relative	equality	in	wealth	distribution	promotes	the	stability	of	the	state	(569);	that	wars	sustain
democracies	(422);	that	most	self-styled	democracies	are	disguised	aristocracies	(705);	and	that	“the	less	the
power	of	the	sovereignty	is	(the	true	marks	of	majesty	thereunto	still	reserved),	the	more	it	is	assured”	(517).	The
claim	of	formal	absolute	authority	(potestas)	thus	merely	laid	the	foundation	for	the	emergence	of	a	new	field	of
knowledge,	the	political	knowledge	that	is	needed	to	establish,	maintain,	and	extend	the	powers	of	civil	government
(potentia).
From	our	examination	of	Schmitt’s	work,	it	is	evident	that	within	the	discipline	of	politonomy	he	maintained	a	realist
position.	It	is	for	that	reason	that,	although	recognizing	that	Bodin	“stands	at	the	beginning	of	the	modern	theory	of
the	state”	(2005,	8)	and	acknowledging	that	“Bodin’s	work	had	a	greater	and	more	immediate	impact	than	had	any
other	book	by	a	jurist	in	the	history	of	law”	([1950]	2006	127),	he	claims	that	Bodin’s	real	achievement	had	been
overlooked.	Bodin’s	innovation,	he	argues,	rests	not	so	much	in	his	definition	of	sovereignty	as	“the	absolute	and
perpetual	power	of	a	republic”	as	on	his	recognition	that	the	sovereign’s	defining	characteristic	is	the	ability,	in	an
emergency,	to	rule	contrary	to	the	established	laws.	“When	the	time,	place	and	individual	circumstances	demand
it,”	Schmitt	notes,	Bodin	accepted	that	“the	sovereign	can	change	and	violate	statutes”	([1928]	2008,	101).	Rather
than	acknowledging	the	world-building	character	of	the	conjunction	of	Bodin’s	constitutive	and	regulative	rules	of
politonomy,	Schmitt	emphasizes	the	decisionist	quality	of	the	sovereign’s	power	to	determine	an	issue	that	“cannot
be	settled	normatively”—“that	which	advances	the	public	good”	(101).
Schmitt’s	reading	of	Bodin	also	signals	his	ambivalent	relationship	to	Hobbes.	Although	praising	Hobbes	as	“a	great
Politonomy
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and	truly	systematic	political	thinker”	([1932]	2007,	64),	Schmitt	was	obliged	also	to	acknowledge	that	Hobbes	was
“a	spiritual	forefather	of	the	bourgeois	law-and-constitutional	state	that	materialized	in	the	nineteenth	century”
([1938]	2008	67).	And	it	is	for	this	reason	that,	in	contrast	to	the	liberal	leanings	of	such	jurists	as	Bodin	and
Hobbes,	Schmitt	sought	to	resurrect	the	importance	within	politonomy	of	the	work	of	Joseph	de	Maistre	and	Juan
Donoso	Cortés	([1922]	2005,	ch.	4).	He	thus	explains	how	“with	an	energy	that	rose	to	an	extreme	between	the
two	revolutions	of	1789	and	1848,”	Maistre	and	Donoso	Cortés,	“thrust	the	notion	of	the	decision	to	the	center	of
their	thinking”	(53).	Schmitt’s	decisionism	once	again	reveals	his	essentially	realist	stance.
While	it	is	not	possible	within	the	bounds	of	this	chapter	comprehensively	to	situate	Schmitt’s	oeuvre	within	this
discipline	of	politonomy,	his	general	orientation	might	be	thrown	into	relief	by	contrasting	his	thought	with	that	of
another	great	public	lawyer—Montesquieu.	Like	Schmitt,	Montesquieu	believed	that	the	law	of	the	political	is	not
discovered	through	normative	inquiry:	it	could	be	exposed	only	through	empirical	study	of	the	history	of
government.	Only	by	immersion	in	the	various	particulars	of	government,	Montesquieu	notes,	can	“the	principles
on	which	they	are	founded”	be	revealed	([1762]	1989,	xliii).	This	was	the	ambition	of	his	most	important	work	on
The	Spirit	of	the	Laws.	The	aim	of	his	study	was	not	to	classify	the	laws	enacted	in	particular	regimes;	those—the
positive	laws—are	merely	the	products	of	a	regime.	Rather,	it	was	to	discern	the	laws	that	have	determined	the
formation	of	those	regimes.	Montesquieu	sought	to	identify	“the	law	of	the	political.”	This—“the	work	of	twenty
years”	(xliii)—was	an	exercise	in	politonomy.
Montesquieu	therefore	examines	the	historical	development	of	governmental	institutions	for	the	purpose	of
identifying	their	spirit.	His	great	breakthrough	was	achieved	by	virtue	of	developing	an	entirely	modern	concept	of
law	(Althusser	1972,	ch.	2).	Before	the	modern	era,	law	was	conceived	as	command.	This	expressed	a	belief	that
the	universe	was	the	product	of	a	divine	creator,	and	it	was	by	virtue	of	his	will	that	order	was	established.	In
defining	law	purely	as	the	command	of	the	sovereign—the	“mortal	God”	(Hobbes	1996,	9)—Hobbes	broke	the
medieval	chain	of	being.	Nonetheless,	his	concept	of	law	was	otherwise	entirely	orthodox.	Montesquieu,	by
contrast,	argues	that	law	is	not	command:	it	is	the	expression	“of	the	necessary	relations	deriving	from	the	nature
of	things”	([1762]	1989,	3).
This	modern	conception	of	law	as	a	relation	applied	to	everything	that	exists,	from	God	to	the	most	basic	units	of
physical	existence	(Montesquieu	[1762]	1989,	3).	The	laws	of	the	physical	world,	Montesquieu	explains,	are	rules
that	express	a	fixed	and	invariable	relation	and	although	accepting	that	“the	intelligent	world	is	far	from	being	so
well	governed	as	the	physical	world,”	he	contended	that	the	concept	of	law	as	relation	was	similarly	applicable	to
human	interaction	(4).
Through	his	meticulous	investigations	into	the	history	of	government,	Montesquieu	([1762]	1989)	distinguishes
between	the	objects	of	his	studies—the	laws	and	practices	of	regimes—and	his	findings:	the	laws	that	determine
their	form.	He	distinguishes	in	effect	between	political	laws,	the	positive	laws	enacted	to	regulate	government	in
particular	regimes,	and	politonomy,	the	law	of	the	political.	Of	particular	importance	is	his	claim	that	politonomy	is
directed	toward	causes	rather	than	motives,	and	the	main	determining	causes	he	identifies	are	those	of	climate
and	geography,	customs	and	commerce,	population	and	religion.	These,	he	argues,	are	factors	of	which
individuals	might	not	be	entirely	conscious,	but	they	invariably	determine	the	type	of	regime	that	is	established.
The	critical	point	is	to	locate	a	consonance	of	nature	and	principle.	Each	type	of	government	(democracy,
aristocracy,	monarchy,	and	despotism)	has	both	its	nature,	“that	which	makes	it	what	it	is,”	and	its	driving
principle,	“that	which	makes	it	act”	(21).	The	power	of	any	regime,	he	concludes,	is	determined	by	the	degree	to
which	nature	and	principle—the	constitutive	and	the	regulative—are	united.
Montesquieu	([1762]	1989)	orientates	his	studies	in	politonomy	toward	the	attempt	to	specify	the	laws	of	political
and	governmental	development.	This	is	a	line	of	inquiry	that	takes	its	cue	from	Book’s	II–VI	of	Bodin’s	Six	Books	and
establishes	an	approach	in	which	others,	such	as	Hintze	and	Weber	followed. 	Especially	with	respect	to	his
institutionalist	work	and	the	scheme	of	development	laid	down	in	The	Nomos	of	the	Earth,	this	is	also	a	trajectory	in
which	Schmitt	can	be	situated.	On	the	other	hand,	certain	scholars	have	contended	that	this	exercise	in	historical
sociology	provides	only	a	partial	account	of	politonomy,	and	this	empirical	orientation	has	the	profound	limitation,
at	least	from	a	juristic	perspective,	of	reducing	the	study	of	the	political	to	that	of	an	observa	datum	and	of
reducing	the	concept	of	political	power	to	that	of	potentia.	This	type	of	claim	derives	mainly	from	the	work	of
Rousseau.
7
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Rousseau	evidently	grasps	the	difficulty	of	addressing	the	issue	of	political	power	in	normative	terms:	in	the
Discourse	on	Inequality,	for	example,	he	recognizes	that	if	we	think	of	government	as	originating	in	a	foundation,
then	the	pact	that	might	have	been	struck	in	the	remote	past	was	a	deceptive	and	fraudulent	device,	drafted	by
the	wealthy	for	the	purpose	of	exploiting	the	poor	([1755]	1997).	But	he	also	claims	that	Montesquieu	had	created	a
great	and	useless	science.	The	problem,	he	explains,	was	that	Montesquieu	did	not	really	bury	down	to	examine
“the	principles	of	political	right.”	This	type	of	exercise	required	a	consideration	of	agency	as	well	as	structure.
Montesquieu	had	remained	“content	to	discuss	the	positive	right	of	established	governments,”	and	this,	Rousseau
contends,	is	a	rather	different	matter	to	that	of	revealing	the	principles	of	political	right	([1762]	1979,	458).
It	is	not	my	task	here	to	determine	the	correct	orientation	of	politonomy.	My	point	is	that	it	has	evolved	as	a
conjunction	of	constitutive	and	regulative	laws	and	that	it	involves	the	dialectical	interaction	between	power	as
potestas	and	power	conceived	as	potentia.	Schmitt’s	original	contribution	is	to	have	staked	his	position	within
politonomy	by	promoting	an	understanding	of	the	political	in	existential	rather	than	conceptual	terms—that	is,	in
accordance	with	the	criterion	of	friend–enemy	rather	than	sovereignty	as	a	representation	of	an	autonomous
conceptual	world—and	in	conceiving	power	essentially	as	a	capacity	to	decide	(potentia)	rather	than	as	a	quality
generated	through	institutional	forms	of	representation	(potestas).	He	evidently	is	able	to	do	so	only	by
suppressing	aspects	of	the	conceptual	and	the	rightful,	and	in	that	respect	doubts	will	persist	about	the	cogency	of
his	theory.	But	by	virtue	of	the	rigor,	insight,	and	brilliant	style	of	delivery	of	his	argument,	Schmitt	stakes	his	claim
to	recognition	as	one	of	the	leading	modern	scholars	of	political	jurisprudence.
This	is	a	double-edged	compliment.	The	fact	that	the	most	powerful	twentieth-century	exponent	of	political
jurisprudence	made	such	a	disastrous	exercise	of	political	judgment	has	been	used	by	some	scholars	to	reject—or
at	very	least	to	marginalize—the	significance	of	an	entire	tradition	of	thought.	Normativism	appears	once	again	to
be	the	dominant	influence	in	legal	thought,	and	legal	scholars	commonly	ignore	the	insights	of	political
jurisprudence.	By	raising	Schmitt’s	status	to	that	of	the	exemplary	figure	of	political	jurisprudence,	normativists
seek	to	ensure	that	his	own	vain	boast	of	being	the	last	representative	of	the	tradition	will	in	fact	come	to	pass.
Conclusion
Carl	Schmitt’s	primary	scholarly	contribution	was	that	of	a	jurist.	To	understand	the	significance	of	that	contribution,
his	writing	should	be	situated	within	the	lineage	of	political	jurisprudence.	Political	jurisprudence	is	a	modern
movement	driven	by	the	objective	of	establishing	a	rigorous	and	compelling	account	of	the	constitution	of	political
authority	in	circumstances	in	which	a	hierarchically	organized,	religiously	constituted	universe	has	been
supplanted	by	a	world	differentiated	into	various	domains	of	thought	and	action.	Only	in	modernity	do	we	see	the
emergence	of	discrete	spheres	of	human	activity	operating	according	to	their	own	criteria	and	necessities:	these
include	the	scientific,	the	technical,	the	aesthetic,	the	legal,	and	the	political.	The	founding	assumption	of	the
political	jurists	is	that	the	modern	form	of	law	(i.e.,	positive	law)	is	essentially	the	product	of	political	power.	Their
overriding	objective	has	been	to	offer	an	account	of	the	way	the	domain	of	the	political	is	constituted	to	render	that
modern	form	of	positive	law	authoritative.	This,	we	might	say,	is	an	exercise	in	politonomy.
The	political	jurists	have	constructed	their	various	accounts	on	certain	foundational	concepts,	most	commonly
those	of	the	state	and	sovereignty.	Schmitt’s	particular	contribution	is	to	have	deployed	a	realist	method	in
analyzing	the	nature	and	significance	of	these	foundational	elements.	This	is	exhibited	mainly	in	his	work	on	the
concept	of	the	political,	the	character	of	sovereign	authority,	the	nature	of	institutional	ordering,	and	the	uses
made	of	the	concept	of	legality.	Although	Schmitt’s	writing	was—and	remains—highly	controversial,	it	continues	to
offer	great	insight	into	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	law	and	politics.	Whether	we	are	trying	to	make	sense
of	the	recent	extension	in	the	constitutional	jurisdiction	of	courts,	figuring	out	how	the	conflicting	claims	of	duties
and	rights	might	be	balanced	with	respect	to	the	values	of	security	and	liberty,	or	determining	the	status	of	the
sovereign	nation-state	in	a	globalizing	world,	having	a	clear	grasp	of	the	relationship	between	the	legal	and	the
political	remains	the	critical	factor.	Today,	that	relationship	is	often	expressed	polemically,	whether	as	a	complaint
about	the	legalization	of	the	political	or	of	the	politicization	of	the	legal.	This	in	itself	is	symptomatic	of	its	deep-
seated	and	enduring	character.	Schmitt’s	work	may	not	hold	answers	to	all	these	questions.	But	compelling
answers	are	unlikely	to	be	found	without	having	taken	seriously	Schmitt’s	distinctive	contribution	to	the	subject.
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Notes:
( )	Operating	under	the	influence	of	legal	positivism,	jurists	today	commonly	define	public	law	as	a	subset	of
positive	law,	treating	public	law	as	the	law	regulating	relations	between	the	institutions	of	government	or	between
government	and	its	subjects,	in	contrast	to	private	law,	which	regulates	relations	between	subjects.	In	this	broader
conception,	public	law	includes	a	study	of	the	juristic	construction	of	public	authority:	it	is	concerned	with	the
manner	in	which	government	is	equipped	with	a	rightful	power	(potestas)	to	rule	through	the	instrumentality	of
positive	law.
( )	See,	e.g.,	Hans	Kelsen	([1934]	1992),	1:	legal	science	must	be	“purified	of	all	political	ideology”	and	of	“every
element	of	the	natural	sciences.”
( )	Some	sense	of	what	Schmitt	means	by	the	term	Goetheans	is	grasped	from	his	comment	in	Nomos	of	the	Earth
(2006,	70	n10):	“The	German	language	today	is	largely	one	of	theologians—the	language	of	Luther’s	bible
translation—as	well	as	a	language	of	craftsmen	and	technicians	(as	Leibniz	observed).	In	contrast	to	French,	it	is
not	a	language	of	jurists	or	of	moralists.	German	gives	a	heightened,	even	sublime	significance	to	the	word	Gesetz.
Poets	and	philosophers	love	the	word,	which	acquired	a	sacred	tone	and	a	numinous	power	through	Luther’s	bible
translation.	Even	Goethe’s	Urworte	orphisch	is	nourished	by	this	source:	Nach	dem	Gesetz,	nach	dem	du
angetreten	[According	to	the	law	by	which	you	began].”	On	the	humanitarians	see	Schmitt	1929.
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( )	This	view	of	the	nature	and	role	of	political	concepts	is	now	more	widely	accepted.	Quentin	Skinner
acknowledges	that	in	believing	that	concepts	“not	only	alter	over	time,	but	are	incapable	of	providing	us	with
anything	other	than	a	series	of	changing	perspectives	on	the	world	in	which	we	live	and	have	our	being”	(2002,
176)	we	are	following	in	a	tradition	that	stems	from	Nietzsche	and	Weber	(and	in	whose	company	Schmitt	would
have	felt	at	home).	He	joins	with	Koselleck	(2004,	80)	in	maintaining	that	“we	need	to	treat	our	normative	concepts
less	as	statements	about	the	world	than	as	tools	and	weapons	of	ideological	debate”	(Skinner,	2002,	176).	In
pursuing	this	line	of	argument	about	concepts,	Skinner	even	prays	in	aid	Foucault’s	(1980,	114)	Nietzschean
position	that	“the	history	which	bears	and	determines	us	has	the	form	of	a	war”	(Skinner	2002,	177).
( )	In	the	Preface	to	Political	Theology,	Schmitt	(2005,	2–3)	admits	that	he	had	arrived	at	institutionalism	as	a	result
of	his	studies	of	“the	profound	and	meaningful	theory	of	institutions	formulated	by	[the	French	public	lawyer]
Maurice	Hauriou.”	But	in	Three	Types	he	seems	to	have	recognized	that,	with	the	establishment	of	the	Nazi	regime,
it	would	be	politic	to	call	this	concrete-order	thought	to	avoid	any	association	with	neo-Thomism	exhibited	in
Hauriou’s	work:	see	Bendersky’s	note	in	Schmitt	[1932]	2004	(112	n59).	On	Hauriou,	see	Gray	2010.
( )	Cf.	the	claims	of	Geertz	1980;	Skinner	1989.	Geertz:	“That	master	noun	of	modern	political	discourse,	state”
(121).	Skinner:	“The	state	is	…	the	master	noun	of	political	argument”	(123).
( )	See	Hintze	1970,	1975;	Weber	1978,	1994.	This	line	of	inquiry	has	inspired	a	wide	range	of	contemporary
works	including	Ertman	1997;	Mann	1986,	1993,	2012.
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